Bourdieu section - habitus

I have drawn on the many writings of Pierre Bourdieu whose social theory I seek to incorporate into my text, to reflect the complexities of social practice and that which it comprises.

In seeking to understand the complexity of Bourdieu’s concepts, I have read some authors who have explained and critiqued aspects of Bourdieu’s work (e.g. Adkins & Skeggs, 2004; Moore, 2004; Nash, 1999; Reed-Danahay, 2005; Reay, 2004; Webb et al., 2002), as well as reading translations of his original writings (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

One of Bourdieu’s theoretical reasons for the development of his social theory was to overcome dualisms present within society – a fixation with binary oppositions and explanations – which causes understanding of phenomena to be over-simplistic, and does not provide an apt framework to reflect the complexities found within society. Post-structuralism fits well with this approach in that the use of labels and categories is avoided and deconstructed in order to reflect the complexity of phenomena, and reveal the contradictions they contain.

Bourdieu’s social theory will be used as a framework to explain phenomena found in literature and phenomena from the research findings. The use of Bourdieu’s theory in my study will help me to present findings and analyse responses from participants specifically in regard to their individual and group habitus and capital, and will also help to position the development of the field within social practice.

Bourdieu’s formula for social practice was written as “(Habitus x Capital) + Field = Practice” (Bourdieu, 1984). I will explain each of these terms in turn – habitus, capital, and field.

Habitus

Habitus is a concept that seeks to explain the dispositions that influence individuals to become who they are, and yet also includes the conditions of existence (Bourdieu, 1990) which individuals’ everyday activities display their relations to society. Habitus explains how the body is present in the social world as well as social world being present in the body (Reay, 2004). While dispositions make up a person’s habitus (Bourdieu, 1998), a habitus is also formed by an individual’s history. As Nash (1999) argued, habitus discloses the traces of its origins in practice. Habitus encompasses how people act in a way that is reflective of social structures and their process of socialisation, which is in turn reproduced by their actions. As habitus is a product of history, which in turn produces more history (Bourdieu, 1990), I will examine the system of dispositions (Bourdieu, 1990) of each participant in the field of out-of-school leisure, which is where their expertise has been constructed, developed, and established. Habitus enables the social practice to be observed in one’s life trajectory (therefore what I will be examining in the case studies). Dispositions include habits, beliefs, values, tastes, bodily postures, feelings, and thoughts that Bourdieu argued were socially produced.

Dispositions are formed by history; they are made, not inherent, and they are inculcated from the past into the present. By inherent and inculcated, I mean that the social agent’s dispositions are embodied and internalised in the social agent’s view of the world, and in ways of moving and acting in the world. The inculcation of dispositions happens throughout childhood, as children watch and listen, therefore, the cultural capital of those they are surrounded by (predominantly their family) becomes part of their habitus. The cultural capital found in the habitus of their family and class becomes their cultural capital also.

Habitus generates and shapes perceptions and actions. Bourdieu referred to the general nature of societal habitus, but as habitus is multi-layered, he claimed dispositions were more specific at the individual level.

One critique of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that it limits an individual to only reproduce what they know – reproduction being a limited and satisfying way of describing one’s ability to act on the world. Habitus has been critiqued as being deterministic. Reay (2004) challenged this and argued,
While habitus reflects the social position in which it was constructed, it also carries within it the genesis of new creative responses that are capable of transcending the social conditions in which it was produced (p. 434 - 435).
The concept that is referred to here is agency. Webb et al (2002) defined agency as “the idea that individuals are equipped with the ability to understand and control their own actions, regardless of the circumstances of their lives” (p. ix). Bourdieu likened a field and its practices to knowing the ‘rules of the game’ or ‘how the game is played’. From there, strategies that an agent may use to act on the world come from an agent’s ability to ‘play the game’ and/or take advantage of the opportunities that come her way. Bourdieu claimed that the code of culture (rules of the game) is not imposed and fixed as a way of being. Actions and ways of being can be generated, created, and invented, though they are limited within structuring mechanisms.

Bourdieu himself grew up in a poor, rural, farming community (see Reed-Danahay, 2004), but was able to make the most of opportunities that came his way, to negotiate the new field (for him and his family) of academe. However, he had issues of identity result from this, as his former acquaintances rejected him because of his actions in moving out of what he knew and out of what they knew (peasant farming).

An example of habitus could be depicted by the description of a church-goer who through her church attendance learns the dispositions and practices of the church, and therefore in her acceptance of the “structured structures” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), she becomes part of the “structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), all of which constitute the social practice considered appropriate by the church as a group. Bourdieu (1990) referred to systematic social order that takes advantage of the body’s disposition to memorize ‘states of being’ in great collective ceremonies and the like, which then can be ‘reactivated’ through the body’s capacity to act in ways specific to such occasions. Therefore, the social order recreates the social order. Though the field is likely to remain the same in each church, the social practice, whether slightly or largely different, would be exhibited as a result of the negotiation of habitus and capital.

Habitus is described in countless ways by myriads of authors including Bourdieu. Nash (year? ’99 I think) acknowledged the indeterminate and broad nature of habitus, which some have difficulty accepting. My definition of habitus is that of internalised principles resulting from one’s upbringing (structured structures) that result in an agent’s action and view of the world, comprising dispositions, which reflect the construction of an agent’s social position, of which is ongoing (structuring structures).

EXPAND ON THE NEXUS OF HABITUS AND CAPITAL (AT THE END OF THIS SECTION?)

DISCUSS GENERAL HABITUS IN THE CONTEXT OF PARTICIPANTS. Here?

Participants

Part of the methodology chapter - this part may be ok.

3.5 Participants

I used my own networks to identify potential participants in the study. This approach to sampling is known as snowball sampling (Patton, 2002) and is discussed in more detail below. First, I approached teenagers I knew with a view to identify potential participants who vary in gender, socio-economic status, and schools they attend (i.e. public, private). From there, I asked other acquaintances to help me contact participants who demonstrate technological expertise.

3.5.1 Snowball Sampling

Participants were selected through what is known as snowball sampling (Patton, 2002) where participants recommended others who fitted certain criteria, and who were beyond the range of people who I know personally. Initially, I asked my acquaintances if they knew of anyone who them deemed to be a teenaged, technological expert.

As my aims do not include obtaining a representative sample, it was fitting that I used this form of purposeful sampling (Patton, 2002), where information-rich cases are selected for in-depth study. Patton (2002) described this approach as a strategy whereby, “cases for study (e.g., people, organizations, communities, cultures, events, critical incidences) [sic] are selected because they are “information rich” and illuminative, that is, they offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest; sampling, then, is aimed at insight about the phenomenon, not empirical generalization from a sample to a population” (p. 40). Therefore, in light of the aims of this study, this type of sampling is appropriate, especially as the selection of illuminative case studies stems from my desire to choose case studies from which the most learning can occur (Patton, 2002).

I have two stepdaughters (aged 18 and 13) and my first official meeting was with them to find out what they thought experts were and if they could recommend anyone who they considered to be a teenage technological expert. My stepdaughters were unable to suggest anyone whom they really thought was an expert, and was also a teenager. It was a positive start to the fieldwork as I was excited about beginning the project and nervous about asking the initial questions. My stepdaughters were excited as well and pleased to be involved, and though it was not an auspicious beginning, starting with family was a comfortable and safe place to begin.

Next, I asked a friend of mine if I could speak with her two daughters (aged 14 and 11). The elder one suggested Jake. I asked her to get in touch with him to see if he would be happy for me to contact him. This happened and I met with Jake about a month later.

One afternoon, some friends of ours visited our home, and we got to talk about Charli who was with my youngest stepdaughter in another room, whom her parents considered to be a computer expert. I immediately leaped out of the room to go and talk to Charli and give her a plain language statement, consent form, and asked her to think about participating. After giving her a week or so to think it over, I rang her mother and then spoke to her, after which she agreed to participate.

My next meeting was with my husband’s work colleague’s stepdaughter (aged 14). I emailed the father and arranged to meet with the daughter. She was unable to suggest anyone whom she knew well enough to speak with first before I contacted them.

As I was teaching guitar part-time, I asked five of my teenage guitar students if they knew of anyone whom they could recommend as a teenage technological expert. These proved fruitful as a one boy recommended his friend Chris and another boy recommended his friend Joe.

When I was at my tennis club one Saturday afternoon, one of the other players asked me what my PhD was on. I replied, “teenage technological experts”, and then he related that he had four of them – his sons. This led to finding Tom, one of the four brothers. Two were ineligible to participate, and the youngest one declined to participate.

Charli and Tom were able to suggest two more possible participants – Lisa and Tim.

The last participant Anne was found through a former teaching acquaintance who has had a lot to do with young adolescents interested in computers. The teacher recommended Anne, and through contact with her younger sister, I was able to meet with Anne and inform her of what the project involved.

With each of these initial contacts, who were not actual participants, I kept a list of what they considered to be an expert, i.e. the descriptors they gave of a technological expert. I did not audiotape these initial meetings. I did not ask my guitar students what they thought was a technological expert as I focused on teaching them guitar, and not taking up their time that they had paid for with my research.

With each participant, I stated and reiterated that they were under no compulsion to participate, and I believe that I did not coerce any of the participants to be involved. I thanked each one of the initial contacts for their involvement and for their contribution, and stressed their anonymity, especially as they were not actual participants.

draft of first part of methodology chapter

I've posted this to demonstrate where I am in my thinking; it also shows that the chapter is rather undeveloped . . . .

Research Paradigm

This section will describe the research paradigm that frames this study and the various methodological choices I have made, in regard to relevant literature. I use the term research paradigm, after Kuhn (1970), to refer to what guides a researcher’s design and conduct of a research study; it includes the broader context of a researcher’s worldview. Guba (1990) defined a paradigm as a “basic set of beliefs that guides action” (p. 17).

Denzin and Lincoln (2000) defined paradigm as an “interpretive framework” (p. 19). Dillard (2006) defined paradigm as “the articulation of the ways that scholars make sense of the research world they live in” (p. 62).

Patton (2002) stated, “Paradigms tell us what is important, legitimate, and reasonable” (p. 69) and that paradigms are really about epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of science. As such, paradigms are important theoretical constructs for illuminating fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality (p. 72).

Dillard (2006) claimed that the ‘Big Four’ paradigms were cultural constructions that were developed from a broader research community, approved by those in power, who “by design or by default” (p. 63) have been given that power. Furthermore, Dillard (2006) stated that paradigms were inherently attached to our notions of, use of, and abuse of power.

Recent discussion (Donmoyer, 2006; Lather, 2006; Dillard, 2006) raises questions regarding the validity of various ‘offshoots’ of paradigms from the Big Four (positivist, interpretivist, critical theory, and deconstructivist), while also questioning whether the notion of ‘paradigm’ is relevant in this day and age. A paradigm is one’s worldview, and from what a person knows and is used to, and from what discourses surround him/her, their paradigm is created, developed, and established. Donmoyer (2006) argues that we should move beyond the Kuhnian-idea of paradigm, and explore new conceptions and new discourses regarding research and inquiry (though he does not suggest with any clear guidelines an alternative model).

Lather (2006) and Dillard (2006) argued that paradigms rely on the hegemonic discourses of the Big Four (positivism, postpositivism, critical theory et al., and constructivism) (Dillard, 2006), and that we should be welcoming diversity, i.e. the proliferation of other paradigms. Lather (2006) argued that there should be encouragement for a thousand paradigms to usurp the four hegemonic paradigms. The influence of the hegemonic ‘Big Four’ should not be the be-all and end-all influence. Why should I box myself into one of those four? The nature of, the understanding of, and the explanation of qualitative research differs from place to place and from researcher to researcher. That will not go away (see Demerath 2006). The lines are blurred; the distinctions are blurred; and the descriptions are arguable. Therefore, I present my own definitions drawing on others’ previous explanations.

My epistemological viewpoint stems from a post positivist position. While positivists focus on the empirical world and what can be measured, post positivists emphasize that ways of knowing are culturally-bound (Lather, 1995). Positivists believe that verified hypotheses can be established as facts or laws, in contrast to post positivists who believe “nonfalsified” hypotheses are probable facts or laws (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Post positivism has asserted that views of knowledge and reality are influenced by one’s pre-conceived beliefs, ideas, and experiences, which allows for alternative constructions of meaning (Patton, 2002). Understanding always rests upon interpretative presuppositions that are historical and subjective in nature (Wicks, 2003), for example, one’s experience is filtered through one’s particular way of understanding, which is a result of one’s upbringing, and the social conventions and language that one has been exposed to (Ingram, 2003). Part of what constitutes my position on the nature of knowledge and its accumulation is the belief that I recognize that values have an influence on the conduct of a study and the findings of a study. I believe that reality is shaped historically by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gendered values – which is part of critical theory (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). My view of the nature of knowledge is influenced by both post positivism and critical theory in that I believe reality is probabilistically apprehendable and is shaped by structural or historical insights (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Denzin and Lincoln (2000) stated, “There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of – and between – the observer and the observed” (p. 19). The positivist epistemological belief that objectivist findings are true, is modified from a post positivist perspective as post positivists believe findings are probably true, and critical theorists believe that findings are value-mediated (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).

I like the idea of critical theory, but my main research method does not include action research. I fully believe that emancipation should result from research, therefore my focus on feminism within critical theory fulfills that area. I am a feminist, but sometimes I am a liberal feminist, sometimes a Marxist feminist, sometimes a socialist feminist, sometimes a Materialist feminist, but never a radical feminist. Where I am on the continuum of feminism depends on the topic at hand.

I am comfortable with deconstruction, but I am not entirely comfortable with post-structuralism. My focus on Bourdieu with his structured structures that are structuring structures led me away from my initial thoughts of agreement about feminist post-structuralism. Though I agree with what Kenway and Willis (1995;1998) describe as being post-structuralism (see page ##), I like the feminism within that, not actually the notion that it is what makes up post-structuralism. Issues of power in, through, and around structures resonate with me in my own construction of feminism. I definitely favour combining elements of critical theory and deconstruction, not favouring one over the other. I esteem emancipation and activism; but also admire the possibilities deconstruction presents as one carves out one’s position, thoughts, and truth in relation to one’s perspective and focus in research. The combination of these two perspectives allows a positive tension, rather than an incommensurable one, such as if one tried to combine positivism with constructivism. With that in mind, I can define myself (moving beyond the limitations of paradigm) as a post positivist, feminist, white-centric, social science researcher. Why am I white-centric? Because I am white. I cannot be other than that; being white is who I am. I acknowledge that if I was African-American or Asian (for example), that this study may have been conducted differently, and that I would probably have read the literature from a different lens, and I cannot sufficiently say that this research covers perspectives from other races or ethnicities, because I am white, and I have no other researchers working with me, and if they were, they would probably be white too. Additionally, as I am a woman, I cannot conduct this research from a man’s perspective or position. Furthermore, I grew up in New Zealand where I believe I have a close affinity with Maori – the indigenous people of New Zealand. Their term for white people is ‘Pakeha’, and I am comfortable with that term to define myself. My paradigm, which I now term my perspective is that of a post positivist, feminist, white-centric (Pakeha), social science researcher.
3.1.1 Feminism

I believe that to do feminist research is to put the social construction of gender at the centre of one’s inquiry. Why be a feminist? Nagy Hesse-Biber (2004) stated,
Whether it be by seeking knowledge from and about women in order to record their valuable life experiences, or to change women’s lives through social policy, a feminist methodology aims at creating knowledge that is beneficial to women and other minorities. In this vein many feminists are social activists seeking to use their research to better the social position of women. While feminist scholarship varies in epistemological position and research a feminist approach to research helps give voice to the experiences, concerns, attitudes, and needs of women (p. 22).

In addition to this view of knowledge and reality, I also hold to the position that social relations and constructions are the result of historically constructed power relations and dominance over the ‘Other’, such as women, non-white races, and subordinate variants of the ideal – this being a feminist post-structuralist position (Abbott & Wallace, 1997; Kenway & Willis, 1995; 1998; Reinharz, 1992). I perceive gendered discourses and masculine attributes of power to be something that social action can confront and change. I think it is important for females to have a critical knowledge about gender issues and inequalities, and I believe it is important to empower females to participate in and commit themselves to contesting, subverting and destabilizing hegemonic gendered discourses (Kenway & Willis, 1995) which seek to subordinate women and non-dominant forms of masculinity. In my opinion, equality between and within the sexes is essential in a just society. I also hold to the belief that action is a goal of feminist research.

##Post-structuralism seeks to identify power in roles, rules and structures, power of males over females, and empower females through gaining forms of knowledge to enable females to understand, deal with, and change their world (Kenway & Willis, 1998). Abbott and Wallace (1997) described four theoretical positions on the nature of social reality. The theoretical position of post-structuralism is defined here:
There are only interpretations – ‘readings’ – of texts, that there is an indeterminacy and heterogeneity of actual meanings and meaning-productions. Like the idealist approach it rejects the ideals of objectivity and neutral judgement and argues that the ideas are the creation of social beings rather than the (more or less adequate) representations of material reality (p. 29).
To me, this definition is closely aligned with constructivism, as I agree with the idea the truth is subjective as it depends on one’s habitus as to how one perceives truth and how one understands reality.

Abbott & Wallace 1997 – focuses on feminism. (feminist standpoint theory) - If biology fully explains gender divisions, there is no need to theorise or explain the subordination and domination of women.
“post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives within feminism questioned the sex/gender distinction. They are argued instead that, just as ‘gender’ is a social construct, so is ‘sex’ – in other words, that sex is used as a justification for the subordination of a group, rather than providing any basis for social differentiation” p. 11.
Three broad responses that seek to fill the gaps in existing theory and research in sociology: integration (remove the bias), separatism (sociology for women by women, e.g. Harding), reconceptualism (rethink sociological theories).
USE THIS AS KEY TEXT TO DEVELOP FURTHER UNDERSTANDINGS OF WHERE YOU ARE ON CONTINUUM OF FEMINISM. Waiting for this book to arrive from Australia 13/2/2006.

Published

AND in print. I received 'Redress' yesterday, a journal published by the Association of Women Educators in Australia, and they have published my article titled, "Technological Efficacy: A New Identity Category: in their December 2005 issue (Vol 14, No. 3).

Yay!

word count

Right at this very moment, my PhD thesis is the same length as my finished MEd thesis.

39058 words - MEd
39085 words - PhD (with no chapters finished!)

Only 45915 words to go.